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In the early hours of October 1st, 1965, six senior generals, in­
cluding the commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Yani, were abducted and 
murdered at the Halim Air Force Base on the outskirts of Djakarta. 
Meanwhile rebel troops occupied Djakarta's Freedom Square enabling them 
to control the President's palace, the telecommunications center and 
the radio station. An announcement was broadcast which said that the 
"September 30th Movement," headed by Lt. Col. Untung, had arrested mem­
bers of the CIA-sponsored "Council of Generals" which had been planning 
a coup against President Sukarno. In Central Java a similar "coup" 
was carried out against the commander of the Army's Diponegoro Divi­
sion, Brig. Gen. Surjosumpeno.
The "coup attempt" in Djakarta had failed by the evening of Octo­
ber 1st. Although President Sukarno had moved to the Halim base, he 
refused to commit himself in favor of the rebels. Meanwhile Maj. Gen. 
Suharto mobilized forces to retake Halim. By the time that Suharto's 
troops had taken control of the base shortly after dawn on the 2nd, 
President Sukarno, Untung and his associates as well as the PKI chair­
man, Aidit, had all left. In Central Java, Brig. Gen. Surjosumpeno 
reoccupied his headquarters in Semarang on October 2nd but his author­
ity was not fully reestablished until three weeks later when reinforce­
ments of elite troops arrived from Djakarta. These troops not only 
restored Surjosumpeno's authority but also set off the massacres which 
eliminated the PKI as a political force in Indonesia.
What was the "September 30th Movement"? Three main interpreta­
tions have been put forward. According to the first, it was, as it 
claimed to be, a movement of military officers who were dissatisfied 
with the army leadership. Secondly, it has been argued by the Indone­
sian Army that the whole affair was masterminded by the PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party). The third interpretation suggests a partnership 
between dissident officers and the PKI leaders.
Initially the PKI was linked to the coup attempt through a number 
of circumstances. It was discovered that Aidit had been present at 
the Halim base on October 1st and that members of communist mass organ­
izations, such as Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia-- Indonesian Women's 
Movement) and Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth), had been present at the 
murder and burial of the generals. The PKI had also given public sup­
port to the "September 30th Movement." In Central Java, the PKI mayor 
of Solo had issued a statement in support of Untung, and on the 2nd a 
PKI-led demonstration was held in Jogjakarta, while in Djakarta the 
PKI newspaper, Harian Rakjat, published an editorial praising Untung. 
These early indications of PKI involvement and support were followed 
by the "confession" of the PKI Politburo member, Njono, which was pub­
lished early in December and the "confession" of Aidit, allegedly ex­
tracted before he was shot, which appeared in the Japanese press in 
February, 1966. In these "confessions" both admitted that the PKI had
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2played a major role in organizing the coup attempt. It was on evidence 
of this sort that the Army's case was originally built.
In January, 1966, two scholars at Cornell University, Benedict R. 
Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, produced unpublished papers (jointly known 
as the fTCornell PaperM) in which they put forward an alternative hypo­
thesis which they felt conformed with all the facts that had been made 
known at that time.1 They argued that the coup attempt was an "inter­
nal army affair" in which discontented and frustrated colonels from 
the Diponegoro Division in Central Java revolted against the generals 
in the army leadership who had been corrupted by the flesh-pots of Dja­
karta. They argued that the PKI had no motive for participating in a 
coup attempt. It had been making great gains under the existing system 
so its best strategy was to maintain the status quo rather than upset 
it by supporting a coup. Thus the involvement of the PKI was inciden­
tal. They hypothesized that Aidit had been taken to Halim firstly to 
prevent the PKI from exploiting the situation and secondly as a means 
of putting pressure on the President to support the movement. The 
utilization of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani members was intended to supple­
ment the very small forces that the movement leaders had under their 
command in Djakarta. These PKI supporters were being trained at Halim 
at that time as part of the Air Forcefs preparations for the creation 
of a "fifth force,"2 so it was not the PKI that arranged for their 
participation but certain Air Force officers. PKI support for the 
coup attempt in Central Java and in Eavian Rakjat was dismissed as not 
proving or even indicating PKI involvement in the abduction of the 
generals. The authority of the Njono "confession" (which Njono him­
self withdrew during his trial in February, 1966) was doubted because 
of a number of blatant inaccuracies, such as references to Politburo 
meetings attended by Aidit and Njoto in July, when in fact both were 
abroad during that month, and Njono’s apparent confusion as to who 
were the members of the Politburo. As for the Aidit "confession," 
which appeared after the Cornell Paper had been prepared, it is cer­
tain that its authenticity would not have been accepted by the authors.3 4
The view that the PKI took no part in the planning of the coup 
attempt was seriously challenged when important PKI leaders appeared 
before the Mahmillub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa--Extraordinary Mili­
tary Tribunal) court set up to try those alleged to have been involved.1*
1. The ,fCornell Paper,” at first distributed privately, was published in 1971 as
Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1,
1965, Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project).
2. In January, 1965, the PKI had proposed the formation of a ’’fifth force” of armed
workers and peasants in addition to the Army, Air Force, Navy and Police. The 
Air Force leaders were sympathetic to the proposal, because its implementation 
would have provided a further counterweight to the power of the Army.
3. Few scholars take the Aidit "confession” seriously. One exception is John 0.
Sutter, ’’Two Faces of Konfrontasi: ’Crush Malaysia’ and the Gestapu,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. VI, No. 10 (October 1966), pp. 535 and 541. The Army did not pro­
duce this ’’confession” as evidence in the Mahmillub trials.
4. President Sukarno authorized Suharto to set up the Mahmillub in December, 1965. 
The full proceedings of the Njono, Untung, and Subandrio trials have been pub­
lished by the Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat (Army Legal Education 
Center). I have also used transcripts of the full proceedings of the Omar Dhani,
3The trial evidence must of course be treated with caution. The Army, 
which conducted the trials, had already blamed the PKI as the dalang 
(shadow-play puppeteer, i.e., mastermind) behind the coup attempt and 
no effort was spared by the prosecutors or judges to drive this point 
home. Further, many witnesses may well have had reason to mislead the 
court and some claimed to have suffered beatings during pre-trial inter­
rogation. However, it is too easy to dismiss the trial evidence out 
of hand. Important admissions were made by both communist and mili­
tary figures which indicated at least PKI involvement.5 In particular, 
the testimony of PKI leaders such as the Politburo members, Sudisman 
and Njono, and the candidate member of the Politburo, Peris Pardede, in 
which their involvement in one way or another was admitted, greatly 
strengthened the Army's case. That these men were not merely reciting 
previously rehearsed "confessions" was indicated by the frequency with 
which they made statements that were unwelcome to the court. While 
they usually admitted the actions of which they were accused, they re­
jected the interpretations made by the prosecution. They denied that 
the coup had been directed against the government and justified the 
actions of the "September 30th Movement" on the grounds that there 
really had been a "Council of Generals" planning to depose Sukarno.
While the testimony of these PKI leaders at least implicated the 
PKI, the Army's case went much further. According to the Army, the 
PKI was the sole dalang which had initiated the planning and organiza­
tion of the coup attempt.6 The key figure linking the PKI to the 
"September 30th Movement" was the head of the PKI's "Special Bureau," 
who was known by a number of pseudonyms, but generally referred to as 
Sjam. Sjam was responsible only to Aidit and his activities were un­
known to most PKI leaders. The Special Bureau had the function of 
maintaining contact with members of the Armed Forces who were con­
sidered to be sympathetic to the PKI. When Sukarno experienced a 
sudden illness in August, 1965, Aidit feared that he might die or be­
come incapacitated, in which case the Army leadership could be expected 
to move to consolidate its position at the expense of the PKI. In 
order to prevent this, he ordered Sjam to mobilize the PKI's support­
ers in the Armed Forces to take action against the Army leadership.
Thus the PKI was responsible for the coup attempt. The military par­
ticipants were mere tools in its hands.
Doubts have been cast on the Army's version on the grounds of its 
inherent improbability. It is hard to believe that officers holding 
important military positions could be manipulated so easily. Further, 
as the Cornell Paper suggested, it is easy to believe that these offi­
cers had reasons of their own for being dissatisfied with the Army 
leadership, regardless of the PKIv Thus, a third interpretation of
Sudisman, Muljono and Utomo Ramelan trials. In the cases of Supardjo, Sjam and 
Wirjomartono, I have relied on fairly detailed summaries of testimony given in 
the judgments. Many other trials have been held which I have not been able to 
consult.
5. This conclusion is also supported by the statements of PKI emigre groups in 
Europe and elsewhere. See Rex Mortimer, "Indonesia: Emigre Post-Mortems on the 
PKI," Australian Outlook, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (December 1968), p. 347.
6. The most complete statement of the Army's case is Nugroho Notosusanto and 
Ismael Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the 'September 30' Movement in Indonesia (Dja­
karta: Pembimbing Mi a, 1968).
4the "September 30th Movement" suggests that it was the outcome of coop­
eration between dissident officers and the PKI leaders. It seems quite 
possible that the military dissidents had already begun to plan their 
move against the Army leaders before contact was made with the PKI or, 
alternatively, there may have been a more or less equal partnership.
So far, supporters of this interpretation have confined themselves to 
pointing out that this possibility remains open.7 In what follows I 
shall examine the testimony presented at the main Mahmillub trials 
which, despite the Army’s aim to prove that the PKI was the dalang, in 
fact suggests that the military figures had their own motives for par­
ticipating and that the original initiative arose within the Army.
Given the purpose of the trials, it is only to be expected that the 
evidence for this interpretation is inconclusive. Nevertheless it is 
not unconvincing. At the same time the evidence presented at the 
trials overwhelmingly supports the view that the PKI was deeply in­
volved.
The case that the PKI was consciously involved in the planning and 
organization of the coup attempt had to overcome a number of substan­
tial objections. Firstly, all of the overt participants were members 
of the Armed Forces, mainly from the Army but also from the Air Force.
No PKI members appeared to be associated with the leadership of the 
coup attempt. If the PKI really did play a major role, why was it so 
heavily disguised and what did it actually do? Secondly, apart from 
one PKI-led demonstration in Jogjakarta on October 2nd, the PKI com­
pletely refrained from mobilizing its mass support behind Untung’s 
movement. If the PKI was involved, why did it fail to utilize its most 
effective weapon in support of the movement? Thirdly, as the Cornell 
Paper said, the PKI "had been doing very well by the peaceful road." 
Political developments in 1964 and 1965 had seemed very favorable to 
the PKI so why did it take the risk of initiating or supporting a move­
ment aiming to upset favorable circumstances?
The argument that the PKI took part in the planning and organiza­
tion of the coup attempt rests on evidence presented at the Mahmillub 
trials held in 1966, 1967, 1968 and later.8 PKI leaders such as Njono, 
Sudisman, Peris Pardede and Sjam stressed that the party really believed 
that there was a "Council of Generals" planning either to take over 
when Sukarno died or to depose him before he died. They were convinced 
that such a take-over would be disastrous for the PKI. When the Presi­
dent’s health gave cause for concern in early August, the PKI’s fears 
became acute. Thus the PKI had a pressing reason for participating in 
the coup attempt. However, the PKI did not have the physical resources 
to challenge the Army leaders in a direct confrontation. If we disre­
gard the testimony of Njono, the picture that emerges from the testi­
monies of Sudisman, Peris Pardede and Sjam is that it was decided that
7. E.g., Donald Hindley, "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order," Indonesia, No. 9 
(April 1970), p. 35, and Rex Mortimer, "Unresolved Problems of the Indonesian 
Coup," Australian Outlook, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (April 1971), p. 99.
8. The view that the PKI was not involved in any way can only be maintained by those 
who completely disregard the Mahmillub trials. For example, despite dozens of 
volumes of Mahmillub testimony, Leslie Palmier asserted in 1971 "that the Indone­
sian Army has left no stone unturned in the search for material to pin responsi­
bility for the Movement on to the PKI" but "appears to have only produced a Con­
fession’ which Aidit is purported to have made just before he was shot." Leslie 
Palmier, "30th September Movement in Indonesia," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5,
No. 1 (1971), p. 15.
5the coup should take the form of an "internal army affair" in which 
dissident middle-level officers would take action against the top 
leadership. The PKI's role in the movement would remain hidden and 
the PKI's mass organizations would not be mobilized so that the impres­
sion would be created that the PKI was not involved. By disguising 
its role, the PKI hoped that the movement would win acceptance more 
easily both within the Armed Forces and from the political public in 
general. The movement was essentially defensive in that the aim was to 
protect the PKI from the "Council of Generals.” There is no suggestion 
that the PKI aimed at taking over the government.9
The evidence presented at the Mahmillub trials by communist lead­
ers clearly implicated the PKI. It was demonstrated that the PKI had 
a motive and that its tactic of disguising its own role was logical. 
However, the evidence of various witnesses at various trials did not 
lead to identical conclusions about the nature and extent of PKI in­
volvement. Three main interpretations can be deduced from the evidence 
given by important communists. Firstly, there is the Njono version. 
Njono confessed that he personally had assisted the rebel officers and 
had arranged for members of PKI mass organizations to be trained as a 
reserve force, but he denied that the PKI itself was involved in any 
way. Secondly, according to Sudisman and Peris Pardede, the PKI lead­
ership had decided to support the coup attempt but it was claimed that 
the initiative came from the "progressive officers." Thirdly, the 
Special Bureau chief, Sjam, gave evidence which led to the conclusion 
that the PKI had initiated the coup attempt and that the officers in­
volved had been manipulated by the PKI. Thus the trials seemed to 
establish that at least some PKI leaders were "involved" in the coup 
attempt but the precise nature of that "involvement" was still subject 
to varying interpretations.
The first Mahmillub trial was held in February, 1966, to try 
Njono. Njono was a member of the PKI's Politburo and headed the Dja­
karta regional committee. He was also the chairman of the PKI trade 
union federation, SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia-- 
All Indonesian Federation of Labor Unions). Njono had been captured 
along with other PKI members and supporters on October 3rd, 1965 but 
his captors had not realized who he was until the middle of November 
when he carelessly signed his own name instead of his pseudonym. He 
was then interrogated with the result that the Army was able to extract
9. Guy Pauker and Justus M. van der Kroef have put forward an "offensive" interpre­
tation of the PKI's involvement. Earlier both had argued that the PKI was becom­
ing the dominant influence on Sukarno's government (e.g., Guy J. Pauker, "Indone­
sia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy'?" Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 2 [Febru­
ary 1965]; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gym­
nastics'," Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 5 [May 1965]). Thus it was difficult for 
them to argue that the PKI's participation was "defensive." Pauker is "inclined 
to believe that Aidit was preparing his own offensive against the Army leader­
ship before the rumours about the Council of Generals spread in late May 1965." 
See Guy Pauker, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Santa 
Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1969). Van der Kroef saw the coup attempt as
part of "the final acceleration of the PKI's drive to power, which began almost 
exactly two years to the day before the September 30, 1965 coup." Van der Kroef, 
"'Gestapu' in Indonesia," Orbis, Vol. X, No. 2 (Summer 1966), p. 459. However 
there are no indications in the trial evidence that the coup attempt was the cul­
mination of a PKI "offensive" that commenced before August, 1965. Instead the 
evidence suggests that it was an almost desperate defensive move.
6a "confession" which was widely publicized early in December.10 In the 
"confession" Njono admitted that the Politburo had decided to support 
the "progressive officers'" plan to foil the coup planned by the "Coun­
cil of Generals." He also admitted that he had been given the task of 
mobilizing 2,000 volunteers from PKI mass organizations to form a re­
serve force in support of the "progressive officers." However, during 
the trial he withdrew the "confession." He claimed that it had been 
made in an atmosphere characterized by "communist-phobia" in which com­
munist prisoners were regularly being beaten up during interrogation.11
According to Njono's story at his trial, the PKI Politburo had 
held three meetings in August after Aidit's return from abroad. During 
these meetings, three matters were raised by Aidit, firstly the illness 
of the President, which was considered to be extremely serious, secondly 
the information that the "Council of Generals" was planning to carry 
out a coup, and thirdly the initiative of a group of "progressive offi­
cers" who intended to take preventive action against the "Council of 
Generals." Aidit asked whether it was better to support the "progres­
sive officers" in taking preventive action or to report the matter to 
the President and wait for his decision. At the final meeting on 
August 28th, Aidit suggested that the second course be taken. Thus 
the Politburo decided to report to the President about the danger posed 
by the "Council of Generals" in the expectation that he would take pre­
ventive action.12
However, according to Njono, the "progressive officers" decided 
to go ahead with their plan despite the lack of support from the PKI. 
Early in September, Njono was asked by the officers to help them by re­
cruiting at least 2,000 civilian volunteers to act as a reserve force. 
The "progressive officers" did not meet Njono directly but sent their 
request through the general-secretary of Pemuda Rakjat, Sukanto, with 
whom they already had contact as a result of the Pemuda Rakjat's par­
ticipation in the Air Force's scheme to give secret military training 
to civilian volunteers. The commander of Air Base Defense Troops at 
Halim, Major (Air Force) Sujono, who was in charge of the scheme, was 
also one of the "progressive officers." According to Sujono's testi­
mony, he had commenced training programs at the Halim base partly in 
order to strengthen local defense of the base and partly to create a 
nucleus for the proposed "fifth force." The program began on July 5th. 
In „ .ly and August four courses were held lasting about one to two 
weeks with at least 200-300 participants in each course. Virtually 
all the participants were from PKI mass organizations such as Pemuda 
Rakjat, BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia--Indonesian Peasant League), SOBSI 
and Gerwani, although there were also some from the left-wing national­
ist party, Partindo (Partai Indonesia--Indonesian Party). In Septem­
ber, two more courses were held over shorter periods with many more 
participants. During the final course, 1,200 participants were given 
training for five days.13 Njono admitted that he had arranged for the
10. Angkatan Bersendjata (Djakarta), December 3, 1965.
11. Njono's testimony at Njono trial. Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat,
'Gerakan 30 September.' Dihadapan Mahmillub I. Perkara Njono (Djakarta: n.p.,
1966), pp. 59-60.
12. Ibid., pp. 33-37.
13. Sujono's testimony at Njono trial. Ibid., pp. 207-223.
7increased numbers required in the final two courses. He decided to 
meet the request of the "progressive officers" although he knew that 
his action was in conflict with the decision of the Politburo.1 *
On September 28th, about 800 of the volunteers were recalled for 
a "refresher" course.14 5 They were told that they were being trained 
to fight against the Nekolim16 who were planning to invade Indonesia. 
These volunteers formed the reserve force of the "September 30th Move­
ment." They were accommodated at Lubang Buaja, within the Halim Air 
Base, where the generals were later taken, killed and buried.
Thus, according to Njono's account, the PKI, as a party, had not 
been involved in the coup attempt. Although aware that the "progres­
sive officers" were planning an action, the Politburo had refused to 
participate. However, Njono admitted that he, as an individual, had 
agreed to support the "progressive officers" by using his position in 
the PKI to recruit additional forces from PKI mass organizations for 
the "September 30th Movement." While Njono knew the purpose for which 
these forces were to be used, the recruits themselves thought that 
they were being trained to defend the nation against the Nekolim.
While Njono's account was consistent with the facts known at the 
time, its veracity can be doubted. By February, 1966, the PKI had 
been widely blamed for the coup attempt and great pressure was being 
put on President Sukarno to formally dissolve it. Thus Njono may have 
seen it as his duty to assume personal responsibility for the partici­
pation of PKI elements in the coup attempt in order to absolve the 
party. The crucial part of Njono's story was his claim that the Polit­
buro had decided not to participate in the activities of the "progres­
sive officers" but to report the matter directly to the President. 
However Njono admitted that Aidit had been deeply worried about the 
probability that the "Council of Generals" would carry out a coup if 
the President's health continued to deteriorate. Further, he admitted 
that Aidit had established contact with a group of dissident officers 
who wanted to take preventive action against the "Council of Generals." 
Moreover, he confessed that he, a member of the Politburo, had cooper­
ated with the dissident officers by recruiting volunteers from PKI 
mass organizations to act as reserve forces. While consistent with 
his claim that he acted as an individual, these admissions at least 
suggested the likelihood of a far deeper involvement of the PKI than 
Njono was prepared to admit.
The story put forward by Sudisman in his trial in July, 1967, 
differed from that of Njono. Sudisman had been the fourth man in the 
PKI hierarchy after Aidit, Lukman and Njoto, and was a member of the 
four-man Standing Committee of the' Politburo. He had been captured in 
December, 1966. Sudisman's account was supported by Peris Pardede, 
who had been a candidate member of the Politburo.
Peris Pardede had also given evidence at the Njono trial. At that 
trial he said that he had been invited to attend a meeting of the
14. Njono's testimony at Njono trial. Ibid., pp. 53 and 79.
15. Sujono's testimony at Untung trial. Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman Angkatan Darat, 
'Gerakan 30 September.' Dihadapan Mahmillub II. Perkara Untung (Djakarta: 
n.p., 1966), p. 114.
16. President Sukarno's term for neo-colonialists, colonialists and imperialists.
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Aidit spoke to the meeting about his recent overseas tour which had 
been cut short when he heard the news of the President's illness. Ac­
cording to the President's doctors, the President faced two alterna­
tives- -either paralysis or death--unless he changed his style of life. 
Aidit considered such a change to be unlikely. After discussing the 
threat posed by the "Council of Generals" and the existence of the 
"progressive officers," Aidit said that he had been asked for his opin­
ion by the "progressive officers" on whether to take preventive action 
or to wait for the "Council of Generals" to act first. Aidit told the 
Politburo that he personally tended to prefer taking preventive action. 
When he asked for their opinions, no one spoke, so Aidit asked whether 
the Politburo would agree to the matter being settled by the Standing 
Committee. When no one objected to this, the meeting closed. About 
ten days later Pardede asked Sudisman what the Standing Committee had 
decided. Sudisman replied that they had decided to support a preven­
tive action by the "progressive officers."17
At his trial in 1967, Sudisman confirmed Pardede's account of the 
Politburo meeting which had handed the question over to the Standing 
Committee. However Sudisman was unclear on the exact date of the 
Politburo meeting. At one point he seemed to agree with Pardede's 
testimony that the Politburo had met "several days" after August 17th, 
while elsewhere he said that this meeting took place on August 28th.
At other times he said that the Politburo meeting on August 28th had 
itself decided to support the "progressive officers." He admitted that 
he could not remember the precise dates of the meetings. Thus it would 
appear that the discussions reported by Pardede as taking place "sev­
eral days" after August 17th may in fact have taken place on August 
28th in which case Pardede's evidence directly contradicts Njono's.
In any case Sudisman stated that the Standing Committee had agreed to 
support the plans of the "progressive officers."
Following the decision to support the "progressive officers," 
Sudisman said that Aidit asked Njono to recruit about 2,000 members of 
mass organizations to become reserve forces at the disposal of the 
"progressive officers." Further Sudisman was asked to send messengers 
to warn PKI branches in the regions to be on guard. Later in Septem­
ber, Sudisman sent messengers to Medan, Palembang, Banten, Central Java 
and East Java in order to inform the local branches of the possibility 
of action against the "Council of Generals." They were also to in­
struct the regional parties to listen continuously to news broadcasts 
from Djakarta and "to assist the Revolutionary Council." It was en­
visaged that local PKI branches would join together with other parties 
and groups in issuing statements or demonstrating in support of the 
coup attempt and the Revolutionary Council which was to be set up by 
the rebels. However they were not told that the PKI itself was in­
volved in planning the action.
Thus Sudisman admitted that the PKI leadership had consciously 
supported the coup attempt. However, he claimed that the PKI had only 
assisted what was essentially a movement carried out by the "progres­
sive officers." Moreover, he insisted that the participation of the 
PKI leaders in the movement did not mean that the party as a whole was 
involved. Reflecting on the support given to the coup attempt, Sudis­
man had come to the conclusion that he and the other members of the
17. Peris Pardede's testimony at Njono trial. Perkara Njono, pp. 130-134.
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high consciousness and convictions of the mass of the people."18 Thus, 
the picture presented by Sudisman was one of marginal involvement 
of the PKI leadership in a coup attempt that was essentially carried 
out by a group of Army and Air Force officers.
In March, 1967, the mysterious Kamarusaman, widely known as Sjam, 
was arrested. He gave evidence at the Sudisman trial in July, 1967, 
and faced his own trial in February and March, 1968. He had been men­
tioned in the earlier trials of "progressive officers" such as Untung 
and Sujono who alleged that he had played an important role in organ­
izing the coup attempt. However very little was known about him until 
he was captured.
According to Sjam, he had first met Aidit during the revolution 
in Jogjakarta in 1945-1946. Later Sjam moved to Djakarta where he 
became an official of a trade union for harbor workers at Tandjung 
Priok. It was at Tandjung Priok that he met Aidit again in 1949 when 
Aidit was detained by police because he had traveled on a ship from 
China without a ticket. Using his influence as a union official, Sjam 
helped to have Aidit released. Aidit then persuaded him to join the 
PKI. Between 1952 and 1955 Sjam worked on the staff of the PKI-domi- 
nated trade union, SOBSI, and in 1957 he became Aidit's personal 
assistant. Later he also worked in the organization department of the 
PKI's secretariat. Sjam's main task was to approach members of the 
Armed Forces in order to win their sympathy for the PKI. He commenced 
this activity in 1957 when he became an informant for the intelligence 
section of the Djakarta garrison.
Late in 1964, the Politburo of the PKI decided to establish a 
Special Bureau to supervise the party's work within the Armed Forces. 
Sjam was appointed to head the bureau which was made directly respon­
sible to the party chairman, Aidit. Sjam's main colleagues in the 
central Special Bureau were Pono and Walujo (also known as Bono). 
Special Bureaus were also established in the regions independently of 
the party branches with the result that regional party secretaries did 
not always know who were the Special Bureau representatives in their 
region. According to Sjam, by 1965 the Special Bureau's activities 
were "running smoothly" in only seven provinces. Of these the most 
successful were in Central Java where contact had been made with 250 
sympathizers in the Armed Forces and in East Java with about 200 sympa­
thizers. In West Java there were 80-100, Djakarta 40-50, North Suma­
tra 30-40, West Sumatra about 30 and Bali about 30.19
On August 12th, 1965, a few days after Aidit's return from abroad, 
Sjam was called to his house. Aidit spoke about the President's seri­
ous illness and the likelihood that the "Council of Generals" would 
take immediate action if he died. He told Sjam that he had obtained 
information about the "Council of Generals" from Sakirman, a member of 
the PKI's Politburo and the older brother of Maj. Gen. Parman, the 
head of Army Intelligence and supposedly a member of the "Council of
18. My summary of Sudisman's version is based on his testimony at his trial.
19. Sjam's trial. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Perkara Kamarusaman bin Ahmad 
Mubaidah (Sjam) (Djakarta, 1968-cyclostyled), p. 6.
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Generals."20 Aidit ordered Sjam to "review our forces" and to "prepare 
a movement." On the 13th, Sjam met Pono andWalujoto discuss possible 
participants in "a movement." They decided to approach Col. Latief, 
the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade in Djakarta, Lt. Col. Untung, 
commander of one of the three battalions cf the Tjakrabirawa palace 
guard in Djakarta, and Major (Air Force) Sujono, the commander of Air 
Base Defense Troops at the Halim Air Force base. All three agreed to 
join the movement. However Aidit felt that more officers should be 
approached so contact was made with Major Sigit, the commander of one 
of the battalions in Latief's Infantry Brigade, and Captain Wahjudi, 
who commanded an Air Defense Battalion. They also agreed to join the 
movement.
On September 6th, the five military conspirators met for the 
first time together with Sjam and Pono of the Special Bureau. They 
met at Wahjudi's house. Sjam spoke to the meeting about the Presi­
dent's illness, the "Council of Generals" and the economic difficul­
ties faced by ordinary soldiers. It was unanimously agreed to take 
preventive action against the "Council of Generals." During the next 
few weeks meetings were held at which they assessed the forces that 
could be won over to their side. However, in the middle of the month 
both Sigit and Wahjudi withdrew apparently because they were not confi­
dent that they could successfully commit their units to the movement. 
Later the question was raised that there was no general among the move­
ment leaders. As it was felt desirable to include a general, Sjam 
promised to contact Brig. Gen. Supardjo, commander of the Battle Com­
mand in Kalimantan. Sjam had known Supardjo since the late 1950's and 
regularly discussed politics with him. Through Supardjo's wife he was 
called to Djakarta on September 28th. He was told that the movement 
was about to commence and agreed to join it.
During the next three weeks the movement's plans were finalized. 
According to Sjam, he drew up the list of "targets." In the original 
list, apart from the six generals who were eventually abducted, and 
General Nasution, who escaped, there were also the former head of Army 
Intelligence, Brig. Gen. Sukendro, the former Vice President, Dr Hatta, 
and the Third Deputy Prime Minister, Chaerul Saleh. However Aidit re­
moved the names of Chaerul Saleh and Hatta from the list because he 
wanted the action to appear limited to the Army. Sukendro escaped 
because he was a member of one of the Indonesian delegations in Peking 
to celebrate China's national day on October 1st. Sjam also said that 
he and Aidit prepared the decree that was issued by the "September 30th 
Movement," and the list of people to be appointed to the new Revolu­
tionary Council that the movement planned to establish.21
The testimony of Sjam thus differed significantly in its implica­
tions from that of Sudisman. In Sudisman's version, the "progressive 
officers" took the initiative and were supported by the PKI. In Sjam’s 
version, it was Aidit who took the initiative by instructing Sjam to 
seek out likely dissident officers to carry out the PKI's plan. Toge­
ther with Aidit, Sjam prepared the list of "targets" and the statements 
issued by the movement. The "progressive officers" played no independ­
ent role. They were tools in the hands of the PKI.
20. Parman was one of the generals killed on October 1st. Sakirman was killed in 
1966.
21. My summary of Sjam's version is based on his testimony at his own and Sudisman's 
trial.
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Despite contradictions between the three versions, they all point 
to some involvement of the PKI. Even Njono, despite his denial of the 
involvement of the PKI as a party, confirmed that the Politburo had at 
least considered supporting the "progressive officers" and that he him­
self had in fact supported them. If the President was likely to die 
and the "Council of Generals" poised to swoop, as believed by Njono, 
it is quite credible that the PKI in fact decided to join the "progres­
sive officers" as described by Sudisman and Peris Pardede rather than 
wait for the President to take action as described by Njono. It seems 
particularly improbable that Njono decided to help the "progressive 
officers" on his own initiative without informing his colleagues in 
the Politburo. Thus it would appear that where the Njono and Sudisman- 
Peris Pardede versions contradict each other, the Sudisman-Peris Pardede 
version is the more reliable.
The difference between Sudisman's account and that of Sjam is 
more difficult to resolve. Sjam's version is not so much in contradic­
tion with Sudisman's as an extension of it. According to Sudisman, 
the PKI Politburo decided to assist a movement already set in motion 
by the "progressive officers." Sjam did not contradict this but added 
that it was the PKI's Special Bureau that had set the "progressive 
officers" in motion. Thus the crucial question concerns the degree to 
which the "progressive officers" acted autonomously. Were they mere 
agents of the PKI or did they have interests and motivations of their 
own?
The evidence presented to the Mahmillub trials does not in fact 
prove that the officers involved in the coup attempt were acting as 
mere agents of the PKI. However, it is shown that at least in Djakarta 
they were consciously acting in cooperation with some PKI members.
The pattern of cooperation may well have been different in the two 
main centers of activity, Djakarta and Central Java. The links of the 
Djakarta group of officers are documented more extensively than is the 
case with the Central Java officers.
In Djakarta the leaders of the coup attempt were Lt. Col. Untung, 
Col. Latief, Major (Air Force) Sujono and Brig. Gen. Supardjo. Untung, 
Latief and Sujono had been involved in the planning from the beginning. 
It appears that Supardjo, who was stationed in Kalimantan, joined them 
at the last moment, although it seems certain that he had been kept 
well informed throughout. Untung and Latief were both former Dipone- 
goro officers. Untung had earlier become something of a national 
figure when he made the first parachute landing in West Irian in 1962. 
In January, 1965, he left the Diponegoro division to become a battalion 
commander in the palace guard. Latief's Infantry Brigade had origi­
nally been part of the Diponegoro ‘division before its transfer to Dja­
karta in November, 1963. Sujono, also a Javanese, was the commander 
of the Air Base Defense Troops at Halim with the additional task of 
training civilian volunteers since July, 1965. Supardjo was born in 
Central Java but served in the Siliwangi division of West Java. In 
November, 1964, he was appointed to head the Battle Command in charge 
of troops engaged in operations against Malaysia in Kalimantan.
At his trial, Sjam classified the officers with whom the Special 
Bureau nad made contact into two categories, "sympathizers" and "candi­
date members" of the party. While the trials indicated that Untung, 
Latief, Sujono and Supardjo were in contact with Special Bureau mem­
bers, it was not demonstrated that they were more than mere "sympa­
thizers" who were willing to work in cooperation with the PKI to
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achieve particular goals, such as the protection of President Sukarno. 
At his trial, Untung strongly denied allegations that he was tied to 
the PKI, although he admitted that some of his friends in his village 
in the 1950's had been communists and that he had been acquainted with 
some PKI members since then.22 Similarly, Supardjo denied having con­
nections with the PKI and in fact had taken part in the crushing of 
the PKI revolt at Madiun in 1948. However, he admitted that he had 
met Sjam in 1956 during operations to suppress the Lubis coup attempt. 
He said that he had only renewed contact with Sjam when he heard rumors 
about the "Council of Generals."23 24 Latief's background is much less 
clear, because he has never been brought to trial and was not even per­
mitted to appear personally as a witness before the Mahmillub courts 
until the Pono case in January 1972, when he denied that he was a PKI 
member. His testimony to earlier trials was always in written form 
and did not provide much information about his political outlook.21* 
Sujono's links with the PKI may have been stronger because he was in 
charge of the secret training of "volunteers," nearly all of whom were 
recruited from PKI mass organizations. But, at the same time, his 
antipathy toward the Army leaders was shared by many Air Force officers 
who had no links with the PKI. Thus, while it is of course possible 
that all of these officers were in fact committed supporters of the 
PKI, this was certainly not demonstrated in the Mahmillub trials.
Although it is not clear how close the ties were between these 
officers and the PKI before August, 1965, it seems established that 
they were prepared to work in close cooperation with representatives 
of the party in the preparations for the coup attempt. According to 
Sjam's testimony, Untung, Latief and Sujono were approached in mid- 
August by Pono and Walujo of the Special Bureau and agreed to join the 
movement. (In addition, Major Sigit and Captain Wahjudi originally 
joined but later withdrew.) They met as a group for the first time at 
Wahjudi's house on September 6th together with Sjam and Pono. The 
account of Untung differs from that of Sjam on the question of who 
took the initiative in calling the meeting, however. Untung told the 
court that he had heard of the plans of the "Council of Generals" to 
hold a coup and, as a member of the Tjakrabirawa entrusted with pro­
tecting the President, had decided to form a movement to purge the 
disloyal generals. He contacted Latief, and together they took the 
initiative of calling the meeting.25 That Latief rather than Sjam or 
Pono had taken the initiative was suggested by Sujono's testimony that 
it had been Latief who invited him to the meeting.26 Thus, Untung 
gave the impression that he and Latief were the initiators of the move­
ment. The main difficulty with this account is that the meeting was 
attended by Sjam and Pono. Untung claimed that he was not acquainted
22. Untung's testimony at Untung trial. Perkara Untung, pp. 37-38, 220.
23. Supardjo's testimony at Supardjo trial. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Perkara 
Brig. Gen. Supardjo (Djakarta, 1968--cyclostyled).
24. W. F. Wertheim suggests that Latief was not permitted to appear in court earlier 
because of his meeting with Maj. Gen. Suharto on the evening before the coup 
attempt. W. F. Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup--The Missing Link," Jour­
nal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. I, No. 2 (Winter 1970). His appearance at the 
Pono trial is reported in Kompas (Djakarta), January 31, 1972.
25. Untung's testimony at Untung trial. Perkara Untung, pp. 35, 36, 55, 58.
26. Sujono at Untung trial. Ibid., p. 102.
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with them before the meeting.27 Unfortunately, he was not asked at 
the trial how Sjam and Pono happened to be present. According to 
Wahjudi, in whose house the meeting was held, Sjam and Pono arrived in 
the company of Latief.28 Both Wahjudi and Sujono also claimed not to 
know who Sjam and Pono were.29
This evidence points to several possible interpretations. First­
ly, it is quite possible that Untung, Sujono and Wahjudi were lying.
By February, when the trial was held, the PKI had not only been blamed 
for the coup attempt but also for almost all other ills in Indonesian 
society. Thus the officers appearing before the court had every reason 
to conceal their associations with the PKI. It was better to emphasize 
that they had acted as patriots to protect the President from the 
"Council of Generals" than to admit to having cooperated with the PKI. 
Secondly, it may have been that only Latief had close associations 
with the PKI. Untung said that he and Latief together took the initia­
tive in holding the meeting. According to Sujono, it was Latief who 
invited him to attend the meeting, and Wahjudi said that Sjam and Pono 
arrived in the company of Latief. Thus it is possible that Sjam worked 
through Latief. Thirdly, it seems equally possible that it was Latief 
who took the initiative in seeking the support of the PKI through Sjam. 
Latief may have invited Sjam and Pono to attend the meeting that he 
and Untung had called. However, as Latief was not questioned in court 
about this meeting, his role remains something of a mystery.30
Although Supardjo had been in contact with both Sjam and the other 
dissidents for at least some months, his active involvement in the 
movement seems to have commenced at the last moment. In Kalimantan he 
had quickly come to the conclusion that the Army leaders were "sabo­
taging" Sukarno's policy of confrontation. According to his testimony, 
he was informed about the "Council of Generals" by Latief in March, 
1965. He then contacted Sjam in the hope of learning more. Although 
stationed in Kalimantan, he visited his family in Djakarta each month, 
and at the same time took the opportunity of hearing about the latest 
developments from Sjam. He also reported regularly to the Commander 
of the Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Omar Dhani, about the discontent 
that was growing in the Army well before the PKI's involvement com­
menced in August. When Sjam told him in August that the "Council of 
Generals" was planning a coup, Supardjo asked that he be notified if 
the situation in Djakarta became "critical." On September 28th he 
came to Djakarta because one of his children was very ill. When he 
met Sjam he was told that the movement against the generals was about 
to commence. According to his story he agreed to join them on the 
evening of September.29th.31 However, it seems likely that he had al­
ready reached an understanding with Sjam and, probably, Latief that he 
would support the movement.
27. Untung at Untung trial. Ibid., p. 57.
28. Wahjudi at Untung trial. Ibid., p. 78.
29. Ibid., p. 79. Sujono at Njono trial. Perkara Njono, p. 208.
30. I have not been able to consult Latief's testimony at the Pono trial except for 
brief newspaper reports.
31. Supardjo's testimony at Supardjo trial and Omar Dhaniat Omar Dhanitrial. Perkara 
Supardjo, and Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Perkara Omar DhaniEx. Laksamana Madya 
Udara dalam peristiwa (Djakarta, 1968--cyclostyled).
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The evidence presented by the "progressive officers" confirms that 
the PKI was represented in the plot. However, it did not confirm the 
Army's allegation that the military officers were simply agents of the 
PKI. It seems quite likely that Untung and Latief had already begun 
talking about the need to oppose the "Council of Generals" before dis­
cussions were held with Sjam. Moreover, both Sujono and Supardjo ap­
pear to have had their own reasons for opposing a coup by the Army 
leadership. It is ox course possible that members of the Special 
Bureau had indoctrinated these officers so effectively that they were 
prepared to carry out the wishes of the party, but it seems more likely 
that such indoctrination was unnecessary. If indeed it was the Special 
Bureau on Aidit's command which took the initiative, it seems more 
likely that its function was to bring the dissidents together rather 
than to provide them with motivation. It is also quite likely that 
once the PKI became involved, Sjam, acting as Aidit's agent, played a 
decisive role. However, the evidence of the Sjam and Untung trials 
does not rule out, and, in fact, in the case of the Untung trial, sug­
gests the possibility that Latief and Untung, perhaps together with 
Supardjo, had already commenced their own planning when they were 
approached by Sjam whom they invited to join them rather than the re­
verse .
The latter hypothesis gains in credibility when we consider the 
"September 30th Movement" in Central Java. In Central Java dissident 
junior officers deposed commanding officers in a series of coordinated 
take-overs including the Diponegoro Divisional Headquarters in Sema- 
rang, two of the division's three military resorts (i.e., Salatiga and 
Jogjakarta) and the 6th Infantry Brigade Headquarters in Surakarta, 
while an attempted take-over of the third military resort at Purwokerto 
failed. At the divisional headquarters in Semarang, the leaders of 
the movement were Col. Suherman, the Head of Intelligence, Col. Marjono 
and Lt. Col. Usman. Following the collapse of the movement, all three 
fled from Semarang with their supporters. They were captured in Decem­
ber and summarily executed. Thus they were not given an opportunity 
to explain their motives and actions.
So far little evidence has been produced to show the extent and 
nature of their cooperation with the PKI. The small amount of informa­
tion available about their backgrounds does not show that they had ties 
with the PKI. In the case of Suherman, his position as Head of Intel­
ligence and the fact that he had only recently returned from a training 
course at Fort Worth in the USA suggest at least that no one suspected 
him of being a supporter of the PKI before the coup attempt. While it 
is possible that these officers and their associates in the district 
towns were all "controlled" by the PKI., no substantial evidence has 
appeared to indicate this.32 The only important Diponegoro officer to 
be tried was Major Muljono, who deposed the commander of the military 
resort in Jogjakarta and proclaimed himself as chairman of the local 
Revolutionary Council. Muljono admitted to being a supporter of the 
PKI, and it was shown that he had a close relationship with a PKI mem­
ber, Wirjomartono, who had the task of cultivating sympathizers in the 
Armed Forces. However it was not demonstrated that Muljono was acting 
on Wirjomartono's instructions on October 1st. It was at least as 
likely that Muljono was taking orders from Suherman and his colleagues
32. According to Nugroho Notosusanto, "the Party controlled half of the chiefs with­
in the Regional Military Command's General Staff." Nugroho Notosusanto and 
Ismael Saleh, The Coup Attempt, p. 43.
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in Semarang. At the trial it was shown that Wirjomartono had sent a 
message to Muljono at about 3 p.m. in which Muljono was advised to sup­
port the Revolutionary Council. However it was not until about 9 p.m. 
that an announcement was broadcast in the name of Muljono as commander 
of the local "September 30th Movement." This followed a telephone 
call from the divisional headquarters in Semarang at 7 p.m. in which 
instructions were conveyed to support the Revolutionary Council.33 34
The hypothesis that the officers in Central Java were acting inde­
pendently of the PKI is strengthened by comparison with other regions. 
The coup movement had widespread and coordinated support throughout 
Central Java, but virtually no similar activity took place in other 
regions where the PKI was strong--such as East Java and North Sumatra. 
In the absence of evidence to show that the PKI did "control" Suherman 
and his colleagues, it is reasonable to believe that they were acting 
for their own reasons. Possibly their motivation was as described in 
the Cornell Paper, or they may have had more specific grievances not 
only against the Army leadership in Djakarta but in Central Java as 
well. Most likely, they shared the widespread devotion to Sukarno 
found among the people of Central and East Java and considered Nasution 
and Yani to be disloyal. It seems certain that the PKI leaders in 
Central Java, and especially the Special Bureau men, were aware of the 
discontent within the division. Naturally they had an interest in 
assisting the dissidents, while the dissidents had no reason to refuse 
their assistance. However, there is no proof that the PKI had a cru­
cial influence on the decisions made by these officers.
What were the links between the Diponegoro dissidents and the 
movement in Djakarta? In the absence of satisfactory evidence one can 
only speculate. Both Untung and Latief were former Diponegoro officers 
who were personally acquainted with the dissidents in Semarang. At one 
time Untung had been a company commander in Suherman's battalion.
After his appointment in Djakarta at the beginning of 1965, Untung 
made two visits to Central Java, the latter being when he accompanied 
the President in about August.31* It seems likely that he met Suherman 
during this visit and discussed the question of the "Council of Gener­
als" with him. Possibly Suherman had already decided to initiate some 
preventive action. On his return to Djakarta Untung would have in­
formed Latief of the plans being laid in Semarang. Meanwhile Sjam had 
been ordered by Aidit to seek supporters for a "movement." It is 
likely that .Sjam was aware of the existence of a dissident group in
33. See Muljono trial, especially Muljono's testimony and the testimony of Major
Surono Hartono who made the telephone call from Semarang. Mahkamah Militer Luar 
Biasa, Perkara Ex-Maj. Muljono (Djakarta, 1968— cyclostyled). According to 
J. M. van der Kroef, "Wirjomartono1s centrally directing role . . . seems over­
whelmingly substantiated." J. M. van der Kroef, "Interpretations of the 1965 
Indonesian Coup," Pacific Affairs, No. 4 (Winter 1970-71), p. 565. My reading 
of the relevant trials does not bear this out. According to Notosusanto, Wirjo­
martono was the "Special Bureau" leader in Jogjakarta (Nugroho Notosusanto and 
Ismael Saleh, The Coup Attempt, p. 45). However this does not appear to have 
been confirmed at the Wirjomartono trial. Wirjomartono said that he contacted 
Major Muljono on the instructions of Sudijono, the Jogjakarta party secretary.
As the Special Bureau operated independently of the party branches, it seems 
highly improbable that Wirjomartono was carrying out Sjam's instructions.
Rather he was acting on the information sent by Sudisman to the branches.
34. Captain Kuntjoro's testimony at Untung trial. Perkara Untung, p. 146.
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Central Java, so he contacted Untung and Latief who were known to have 
contact with them. Thus it may be that the PKI became involved in what 
was originally a movement within the Diponegoro Division.
The evidence of the Mahmillub trials indicates that the purpose of 
the Mcoup attempt” was to eliminate the ’’hawkish” leadership of the 
Army, which was suspected of planning to move against both the Presi­
dent and the PKI. The evidence does not show that the ’’September 30th 
Movement” expected to dominate the government after October 1st, nor 
that the PKI was drawn into the plot with the motive of enhancing its 
position in the government. Rather the ’’coup” was a pre-emptive strike 
against the PKI’s most dangerous opponents.35 If the PKI and its mili­
tary associates had expected to take over or dominate the government, 
the killing of the generals would not have mattered much, but as the 
’’coup” was essentially defensive in purpose, the murders were a disas­
trous mistake. It seems that the news that at least some of the gen­
erals had been killed was a major factor in influencing President 
Sukarno not to endorse the movement. Further, the murders made it im­
possible for the movement to win the support or at least tolerance of 
the surviving Army leadership.
There are strong indications in the trial evidence that the plot­
ters did not plan to kill the generals.36 Sjam’s testimony on this 
point is somewhat contradictory. At his own trial he said that the 
aim had been to arrest the generals and hand them over to the Revolu­
tionary Council which would ’’investigate” their plan to hold a coup.37 
At the Sudisman trial, Sjam had told the same story but a few minutes 
later said that at a meeting held on September 29th, he, Pono, Untung, 
Latief and Sujono had decided to kill the generals.38 Untung, at his 
trial, denied ordering the killing of the generals but he admitted 
having ordered Lt. Dul Arief, tlu. officer in charge of the soldiers 
who raided the generals’ homes, to make sure that none of them es­
caped.39 40 A number of participants in the raids claimed that Dul Arief 
had ordered them to take the generals ’’dead or alive.”1*0 In the event, 
three of the generals, including Yani, resisted and were killed at 
their homes, while the others were brought alive to Lobang Buaja at 
Halim. According to the officer in charge at Lobang Buaja, Major (Air 
Force) Gatot Sukrisno, both he and Dul Arief were very agitated to 
find that three of the generals had already ’’been put to sleep.” Dul 
Arief wanted Gatot to kill the remaining three, but Gatot insisted on 
sending a note to Major Sujono, who replied that they should be
35. This view is also put in Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismael Saleh, The Coup Attempt, 
p. 9.
36. Pauker has suggested ’’that somewhere down the line a political operation was 
turned into a crude murder plot.” G. Pauker, ’’The Gestapu Affair of 1965,” 
Southeast Asia, Vol. I, No. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 55-56.
37. Sjam’s testimony at Sjam trial.
38. Sjam’s testimony at Sudisman trial. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Perkara Sudis­
man (Djakarta, 1968--cyclostyled).
39. Untung's testimony at Untung trial. Perkara Untung, p. 59.
40. See testimonies at the Untung trial. Ibid., pp. 123, 133, 135, 139.
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"finished off."**1 According to Sujono, he had merely transmitted 
Latief's order in his reply.1*2 At the Sjam trial, Sjam said that he 
himself had proposed that the remaining generals be shot and that the 
others agreed to this.1*3
The most likely resolution to these contradictions is that during 
the Sudisman trial Sjam temporarily confused the date of the decision 
to kill the generals when he said that it was made on September 29th.
It may be that on September 29th the movement leaders discussed the 
possibility that some of the generals might resist arrest and the risk 
that they might be killed. Nevertheless, it was decided to go ahead 
despite the risk. As the order was transmitted down from the leaders 
to the men, it necessarily had to be put in more concrete terms. While 
the leaders could airily talk of "securing" (mengamankan) the gener­
als, 1*‘* the members of the raiding parties had to know exactly what to 
do in the event of difficulties. While Untung ordered Dul Arief to 
make sure that "none escape," Dul Arief bluntly told his troops to 
"get them dead or alive." However, it seems that no one expected that 
as many as three, including Yani, would indeed be dead on arrival at 
Lubang Buaja. This explains the consternation of Gatot Sukrisno and 
Dul Arief. As leader of the troops responsible foi killing the three 
generals, Dul Arief wanted Gatot to kill the other three so that re­
sponsibility might be shared. When Gatot's note reached the movement 
leaders, they apparently decided that there was now nothing to lose 
from killing the other three. Probably they had begun to panic on 
hearing that Nasution had escaped and Yani had been killed.
What might have happened if the "coup attempt" had been carried 
out according to plan? If the generals, including Nasution, had all 
been arrested and accused of plotting against the President, it is 
plausible to believe that the President would have endorsed the 
"September 30th Movement's" action. With Presidential endorsement it 
would have been very difficult for the remaining Army leadership to 
move against the dissidents. Most likely the matter would have been 
settled in the traditional style of musjawarah (consultations) leading 
to a compromise which weakened the "hawks" in the Army leadership with­
out reversing its fundamentally anti-communist outlook. Possibly 
Sukarno would have insisted on the dismissal of Yani and some of his 
colleagues. However, it is unlikely that he would have been able to 
impose a pro-communist commander on the Army. Such an appointment 
would not have been accepted by the most senior officers in direct 
command of troops such as Suharto (Strategic Reserve Command), Umar 
Wirahadikusumah (Djakarta), Adjie (West Java), Basuki Rachmat (East 
Java) and Mokoginta (Sumatra), all of whom were strongly anti-commu­
nist. Thus the "September 30th incident" was in fact not so much a
41. Gatot Sukrisno's testimony at the Untung trial. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
42. Sujono's testimony at Untung trial. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
43. Sjam at Sjam trial.
44. Referring to an earlier plot, Anderson noted that "It must be recognized, how­
ever, that in Javanese social communication, much is commonly left unsaid, 
great trust being put in intuitive understanding; this pattern, while sharpen­
ing subtle sensibilities, frequently leads to confusion and misunderstanding." 
Benedict R. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1972), p. 396.
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"coup" against the government but an attempt to force Sukarno's hand 
within the existing governmental structure.
In this article I have argued that the testimony presented to the 
Mahmillub trials is open to more than one interpretation. While the 
evidence that the PKI leaders were indeed deeply involved in the coup 
attempt seems overwhelmingly strong, conclusions commonly drawn on the 
basis of the trial evidence in regard to the nature of its involvement 
and its motives seem open to question. The trial evidence in fact 
suggests that it is quite likely that the idea to purge the top Army 
leaders originated among middle-level officers in the Diponegoro Divi­
sion and their colleagues in Djakarta. The Army's claim that it was 
the PKI, through Sjam, which initiated the movement is not proven in 
the trials. The PKI's involvement only commenced when Aidit became 
convinced that the delicate balance of Djakarta politics was in danger 
of being upset by the demise of the President. While Sjam may have 
played a dominant role in formulating the movement's plans in Djakarta, 
there is little to show that the PKI's influence was substantial in 
Central Java. The basic aim of the movement was to arrest the generals 
who were believed to be plotting against the President, in the hope 
that he would then be able to take action against them.
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